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Tax Advantages of Retirement Plans
Sheldon M. Young* and Martin Silverman**
I. Background
N 1930, THERE WERE APPROXIMATELY 110 RETIREMENT plans in
the United States which could be classified as pension, profit-
sharing or stock bonus programs. This mere ripple on the sea
of American business has, in less than a generation, grown to a
wave of respectable proportions, for there are now approxi-
mately 43,000 such plans which have qualified before the Treas-
ury Department as programs to which tax-deductible contribu-
tions may be made and upon which contributions tax-free in-
terest may be accumulated.'
A great many factors have been responsible for this phe-
nomenal growth-not the least of them being the impetus given
to the establishment of pension plans as a result of labor nego-
tiations initiated by unions after the Inland Steel decision of
1949,2 wherein the National Labor Relations Board ruled that
pensions were a proper subject of collective bargaining. Most
authorities, however, recognize that high corporate and personal
income tax rates, and broad beneficial tax privileges accorded
to recipients of benefits under such programs are largely re-
sponsible for the adoption of these programs.
It must first be recognized that the tax rules respecting a
pension plan present an anomaly in American income tax law.
Normally, when one person is able to claim a deduction for a
payment made to benefit another, the latter must include that
payment in reporting his income for tax purposes. However, a
payment into a pension plan by an employer for the benefit of an
* A.B., Ohio State University; LL.B., Ohio State University; Member of the
Ohio Bar; Associated with Eugene M. Klein and Associates, Actuaries and
Pension Plan Consultants, Cleveland, Ohio. Presently preparing Master's
Thesis, "Selected Problems in Pension Plans," for Western Reserve Univer-
sity College of Law. Much of the legal information herein was obtained
through research in connection with such thesis.
** A.B., Western Reserve University; Associate of the Conference of Ac-
tuaries in Public Practice; Actuary in charge of Insured and Combination
Retirement Plans Department, Eugene M. Klein and Associates, Actuaries
and Pension Plan Consultants, Cleveland, Ohio; and a second year law
student, Cleveland-Marshall Law School.
1 Statistics as to number of qualified programs are from Prentice-Hall Pen-
sion and Profit-Sharing Report, May 9, 1958, Vol. XVIII, Number 1.
2 Inland Steel Co. v. N. L. R. B., 170 F. 2d 247 (7th Cir., 1948).
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employee will not be taxable to the employee if the pension
plan meets certain criteria set forth in the Internal Revenue
Code. Immediate accrual of benefits with tax treatment thereof
deferred to a later date when tax rates may be lower and/or
when total income subjected to our graduated system of income
tax may be less, presents a pattern which the key personnel of
the corporation usually find to be highly advantageous to them.
If such key personnel are sufficiently influential in the coun-
sels of the corporation, either because of stock control or in-
trinsic ability, they can and will cause the corporation to adopt
the program. Since 1942, they have done so in increasing num-
bers.
The rule for deferred tax treatment has been in effect since
1921. 3 The statutory rules for qualification as they exist today
have been in effect since 1942. Prior to 1942, the Treasury De-
partment was disposed to look upon retirement programs for
small organizations as surreptitious schemes for the deferment
of income for a few highly placed officers and shareholders 4 -
a system hardly palatable to the social philosophy of the times.
In an attempt to minimize the adoption of programs for such
purposes, Regulations 101 under the 1938 Internal Revenue Act
provided that a pension plan was a program "solely designed and
applied to enable all or a large percentage of the total number of
the employer's clerks and workmen (as distinguished from per-
sons in positions of authority) to . . . provide for the livelihood
of such employees upon their retirement from employment." 5
The Internal Revenue Code of 1938, however, provided that "a
stock bonus, pension, or profit-sharing plan of an employer for
the exclusive benefit of some or all of his employees" would
qualify for favorable tax treatment; and in the Harris case, 6 the
Board of Tax Appeals recognized that an employees' trust main-
tained solely for certain executives was within the scope of the
statute. To combat the trend, the Treasury Department in 1942
presented proposals to the House Ways and Means Committee
for revisions in the qualification requirements. Ultimately, the
Revenue Act of 1942 provided that at least 56 per cent of all
employees (excluding those employed temporarily or part time
8 Winslow and Clark, "Profit-Sharing and Pension Plans" (Commerce
Clearing House, 1939), p. 108.
4 Ibid., pp. 95-96; 105.
5 Art. 165-1 of the 1938 Regulations.
6 Albert W. Harris; BTA Memo Op. (1939).
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or having less than five years of service) of an employer must
be covered, or that the plan cover employees under a classifica-
tion found by the Commissioner not to be discriminatory in favor
of officers, stockholders, supervisory employees, or highly com-
pensated employees. 7 The Code further stated that a program
limited to salaried and clerical personnel would not be dis-
criminatory and that programs would not be discriminatory when
the contributions or benefits bore a uniform relation to th6 basic
or total compensation of the covered employees."
Paralleling this clarifying development of the Government's
position was the rise in corporate and excess profits taxes during
World War II. Many employers found it relatively inexpensive
to adopt plans and include large numbers of employees there-
under when the amount to be contributed would, if there were
no plan, be taxed as income by as much as 85 per cent. More-
over, salary "freezes" in effect during the war increased the
propensity for management to explore new routes to compensate
the executive. The pension plan presented one avenue without
too many barriers, and the corporate executive, faced with
personal tax rates that he was prone to call "confiscatory," was
responsive to any approach that would make it possible for him
to be benefited, but not taxed. While excess profits taxes fell
after the war, high corporate rates and high individual rates
continued, and as we shall show subsequently, continued to be
persuasive inducements to maintaining and adopting retirement
programs.
As conducive to the adoption of the program as the low
after-tax cost to the employer and non-immediate-tax benefits
to the employee were favorable provisions in the tax law mini-
mizing the amount of tax to be paid on benefits when ultimately
received. For example, benefits payable in a lump sum in one
year as a result of termination of employment are taxed at the
capital gain rate-currently 25 per cent. If payable in install-
ments, it must be recognized that the installments may be pay-
able when the recipient's income has dropped substantially below
the amount of his income during the years of accumulation of the
funds required for the installment payments, and that one is
entitled to two exemptions if he is age 65 or over, and four ex-
7 Section 165 (a) (3) (B), Internal Revenue Code of 1939, as amended; now
Section 401 (a) (3) (B), Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
8 Section 165(a) (5) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, as amended; Sec-
tion 401 (a) (5) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
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emptions if both he and his wife are age 65 or over. In addition,
collateral death benefits are payable virtually income tax free
to the employee's beneficiary and, since 1954, under recently
published estate tax rules, are free of estate taxes.
In 1940, there were, according to the National Planning As-
sociation, approximately 1,965 plans in operation covering some
3.7 million employees; in 1945, 7,425 plans covering 5.6 million
employees; and in 1950, 12,330 plans covering 8.6 million em-
ployees.9 Assuming that an insignificant number of plans
adopted were later discontinued and that an insignificant num-
ber of those adopted duplicate the coverage of those already
adopted,' 0 these statistics would lead us to the conclusion that
there are fewer persons covered per plan today than previously,
while the number of plans is constantly increasing. To the
personal knowledge of the writers, this has been a trend which
has gone on for at least the last ten years. The balance of this
paper will attempt to show the tax incentives which have in-
duced the small employer to cover a limited classification of his
employees under such a program.
II. Application of Tax Advantages to a Closed Corporation
All of the foregoing tax advantages are dramatically ac-
cented in the case of a qualified retirement plan established by a
small, closely held corporation, where 100 per cent of the stock
of the company is owned by the president of the company and
his family. The introduction of more modern means of funding
retirement plans, such as specially designed insurance contracts,
and pooled investment funds for pension plan purposes," now
enable the smaller companies to maintain flexible low-cost plans
heretofore available only to larger firms.
As a case in point, consider the financial effect of the estab-
lishment of a qualified retirement plan by a small corporation
under typical, though hypothetical, facts. For the purposes of
the illustration, it will be assumed that all payments to fund the
9 National Planning Association, Pensions in the United States, a study
prepared for the Joint Committee on the Economic Report, 82nd Congress,
2d Sess. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1952), p. 11.
10 Many employers do cover employees under more than one program, such
as a basic pension plan and pension plan whose benefits are based solely
on earnings over $4,200; or under a pension plan and a profit sharing plan.
11 Cf. Regulation F, Trust Powers of National Banks, Board of Governors,
Federal Reserve System.
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pension plan considered will be made from that part of annual
corporate income in excess of $25,000. Significantly, corporate
income in excess of $25,000 is currently taxable at the rate of
52 per cent.
A. Type of Retirement Plan.
The retirement plan under consideration is a typical retire-
ment plan for salaried and clerical employees of the Company,
which we shall call The X Corporation, founded ten years ago
by Mr. Executive, president and sole owner. Benefits of the
plan are funded on a "combination basis"-that is, by means of
a combination of deposits to an Insurance Company and de-
posits to an Auxiliary Conversion Fund held by a Trustee as
part of a larger pooled investment fund. The deposits to the
Insurance Company provide for insurance protection during
the employee's working years and also serve to build up values
to buy part of the retirement income. Because of the size of the
group which will be insured, the insurance carrier will normally
issue most, if not all, of the insurance required under the pro-
gram without requiring individual evidence of insurability
through medical examination or otherwise. Therefore, everyone
will be insured. The excess of the cost of the employee's
scheduled annuity over the cash value of his insurance at the
time the annuity is to begin is provided by funds accumulated
and invested for this purpose in an Auxiliary Conversion Fund.
At retirement, an amount is withdrawn from this Conversion
Fund and turned over to the Insurance Company to be com-
bined with the cash value of the insurance to provide the re-
quired pension benefits. The entire cost of the Plan is paid by
the Company and no contributions are required of employees.
B. Eligibility for Participation in the Plan.
All salaried and clerical employees of The X Corporation
are eligible to participate in the plan when they have reached
age 30 but are not yet age 60, and have completed 5 years of
employment with the Company. At the inception of the plan,
out of a total of 25 salaried and clerical employees, 13 are initially
eligible to participate. The classification is reasonable within
the scope of Section 401 of the Internal Revenue Code, even
though the 13 will be less than 56 per cent of all the employees.
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C. Benefits Provided by Plan.
Seven distinct classes of benefits are provided by the plan
considered by The X Corporation. The tax effect of each upon
the recipient thereof will be discussed later. The types of benefits
and the requirements for entitlement are as follows:
1. Normal Retirement Pension-A pension payable at age
65 to employees who remain with the Company and elect to re-
tire at that time. The amount of pension is determined by a
formula set forth in the plan, usually expressed as a function
of the annual salary and the years of service with the Company.
The formula under consideration provides for a monthly pension
of $50.00 plus 25 per cent of the monthly salary in excess of
$350.00, subject to a maximum monthly pension of $600.00.
Pensions are proportionately reduced for less than 20 years of
service at age 65.
2. Late Retirement Pension-A pension payable at any time
after age 65 to employees who do not elect to retire at such age,
but are permitted to remain in active employment beyond age 65.
3. Early Retirement Pension-A pension payable in the
event of retirement before age 65, usually on or after age 60.
The Early Retirement Pension is usually expressed as a reduced
actuarial equivalent of the Normal Retirement Pension. The
reduction is attributable to the longer life expectancy of the
employee retired at the earlier age, with the annuity starting at
such earlier age, and the lesser period of contributions by the
Company.
4. Disability Retirement Pension-A pension payable in the
event of retirement because of mental or physical disability,
usually on or after age 50. The Disability Retirement Pension
under a program for a small number of salaried and clerical em-
ployees is usually expressed as a reduced actuarial equivalent
of Normal Retirement Pension, based on age and service of re-
tired employee at time of disability.
5. Termination of Service Benefit-At termination of serv-
ice for any reason other than retirement or death, the terminat-
ing employee is entitled to a portion of the cash value of the in-
surance coverage held for his benefit, usually expressed as a
percentage, e.g., 5 per cent, of the cash value for each year of
employment (not to exceed 100 per cent of such cash value).
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6. Death Benefit Before Retirement-If the death of a par-
ticipant occurs prior to retirement, his designated beneficiary
will receive $1,000 for each $10.00 of monthly pension. For
example, if the anticipated monthly pension is $100.00 per month,
the death benefit is $10,000; if the anticipated monthly pension
is $150.00 per month, the death benefit is $15,000, etc. Again,
note that the bulk, if not all, of the insurance to provide the
death benefit will be issued without the insured having to prove
his insurability.
7. Death Benefit After Retirement-If death occurs before
the retired employee has received his pension for 120 months, his
designated beneficiary will continue to receive the pension for
the remainder of such 120 month period. For example, if a retired
employee lives only 1 year after retirement and receive only 12
pension payments, his designated beneficiary will continue to
receive the same payments for 9 more years (108 payments).
However, if a retired employee lives for 10 full years or longer
after retirement, the pension payments are guaranteed to con-
tinue for as long as he lives, but no survivorship benefits are
paid after such 10 year period.
D. Analysis of Individual Benefits and Costs.
The following Table I sets forth a summary of the individual
benefits and costs applicable to The X Corporation:
TABLE 1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Value of
Benefit
Annual Monthly Insurance At Normal Annual
Employee Age Salary Pension* Protection Retirement** Cost***
A 54 $45,000 $600.00 $60,000 $97,380 $8,612
B 44 12,000 210.00 21,000 34,083 1,400
C 36 10,020 170.00 17,000 27,591 725
D 37 10,020 170.00 17,000 27,591 765
E 34 9,600 160.00 16,000 25,968 618
F 35 7,200 110.00 11,000 17,853 450
G 31 6,300 90.00 9,000 14,607 305
H 44 6,000 90.00 9,000 14,607 606
I 35 5,700 80.00 8,000 12,984 330
J 48 5,400 80.00 8,000 12,984 703
K 32 4,500 60.00 6,000 9,738 217
L (f) 43 4,800 70.00 7,000 12,775 481
M (f) 53 3,400 50.00 5,000 9,125 723
TOTAL COST $15,935(f) Female.
(Continued on next page, footnote)
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m. Tax Advantages of Adoption of Retirement Plan
to Mr. Executive Personally
Let us first examine and analyze the value of the retirement
plan to Mr. Executive (Employee A) personally, from the stand-
point of the tax advantages to be gained merely by the adoption
of the retirement plan.
A. Cost of Mr. Executive's Benefits in Relation to Total Cost
of Plan.
As can be seen from Column 7 of Table 1 the cost of sus-
taining the retirement plan in the first year of its operation is
$15,935. Of such amount, $8,612, or approximately 54 per cent, is
the cost of the benefits for Mr. Executive. (See Tables 2 and 3
below.) As the total cost is tax deductible from corporate net
income at the 52 per cent rate, it is manifest that the entire cost
of providing benefits for all participants other than Mr. Execu-
tive is being paid for in dollars that would otherwise be paid in
income taxes. The following illustrates the point:
Total Cost of Plan- $15,935
48%
Net Remaining After Taxes- $ 7,649
Less: Cost for Mr. Executive- 8,612
Cost for All Other Participants -0-
In lieu of adopting the retirement plan, an amount equiva-
lent to the first year cost of the Plan of $15,395 could be used to
raise Mr. Executive's salary. It is assumed that the Treasury
Department would not challenge such an increase as making Mr.
Executive's compensation "unreasonable" and that the total new
salary would be deductible at the 52 per cent tax rate. The
net increase to Mr. Executive after taxes on this basis would be
approximately $9,591, or approximately 11 per cent more than
the cost of providing him with his benefits under the retirement
plan. This would, as shown below, buy about the same benefits
(Continued from preceding page)
* Normal age pension payable at age 65, in addition to Social Security.
** Lump sum actuarial value of pension at Normal Retirement Age of 65.
*** Computed on the basis of level funding from entry into the program to
normal retirement age, to be deducted under Sec. 404 (a) (1) (B). If
computed on a basis to be deducted under Sec. 404(a) (1) (C), precise
individual cost allocations would not be possible because of aggregate
method of cost computations.
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for Mr. Executive outside the Plan as under it, while under it,
12 more people benefit.
Will the government approve such a retirement program?
In the 1940's the Treasury Department had ruled that a program
would not qualify under Section 165 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1939, as amended, if contributions required to provide
benefits for employees, each of whom owned, directly or in-
directly, more than 10 per cent of the voting stock of the cor-
poration, exceeded, in the aggregate, 30 per cent of the contribu-
tions for all participants under the plan.12 The issue was taken
to the courts, inasmuch as such ruling flagrantly conflicted with
the express words of the statute that a program would not be
discriminatory where the contributions or benefits bore a uni-
form relation to the compensation of officers, shareholders, su-
pervisory or highly compensated employees. The statute contains
no words indicating that stricter criteria are to be applied in
determining whether discrimination exists in favor of share-
holders than in determining whether discrimination exists in
favor of the other three classes. In Volckening, Inc.1 3 the Tax
Court sustained the taxpayer in holding that a pension plan was
not discriminatory even though more than 50 per cent of the
employer contributions were for the benefit of the husband-and-
wife sole stockholders. As a consequence, the so-called "30 per
cent rule" was revoked. 14
Positions die harder than rules, however, and the agents in
the Treasury Department who fought against Section 165 of the
pre-1942 Acts becoming a device for benefiting shareholders
have in many cases fought tenaciously against programs which
are called "top-heavy." Confusing the issue is Part 5(c) of
Revenue Ruling 57-163 which talks of top-heaviness, states that
ceilings are not needed when benefits bear a uniform relation
to compensation, and then concludes that ceilings may satisfy
"other essential requirements." All too often, agents have re-
ferred to the Section as their authority for clamping down on a
"top-heavy" plan. In a case of the type discussed in this ex-
ample, it is unlikely that the agent would refuse approval but
possible that he would be more discriminating in his review.
Nevertheless, it is the experience of the writers that programs
of this type have been repeatedly approved where a determined
12 IT 3674 (1944).
13 13 T. C. 723 (1949).
14 IT 4020 (1950).
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position has been taken and where there has been insistence that
the statute be followed-and rightly so.
It must be remembered that at least one measure of the
value of money is what it will buy for Mr. Executive as con-
trasted with his proportionate interest in the payment. Even if
the total payment to the program were smaller so that Mr.
Executive's interest in it rose in proportion, the value of the
program would be as great to him. Conversely, if his interest
in the total payment were 10 per cent rather than 50-plus per
cent, the payment on his behalf would do the same work for him.
It is therefore necessary to determine what the value of the pay-
ment is to Mr. Executive in terms of what it would cost his
corporation to provide him with a salary increase which, after
taxes, would leave him with his present net income plus an
amount sufficient to buy benefits equivalent to the benefits under
the program.
B. Cost of Providing Mr. Executive With Equivalent Benefits
Outside the Plan.
The retirement plan contemplates that Mr. Executive will
have a pension of $600.00 per month upon retirement at or
after age 65. Until then, he will be insured for $60,000.
To obtain equivalent benefits outside the retirement plan,
it would be necessary for Mr. Executive to purchase insurance,
prove his insurability, and accumulate cash with his net income
after taxes. At least two alternative personal programs could be
employed.
One such program involves buying insurance now and ac-
cumulating savings or investments to purchase an annuity at
age 65. However, an annuity that will be bought eleven years
from now will be at insurance company purchase rates then in
effect. Based on the history of such rates which have over the
past fifteen years increased by at least 15 per cent, it is an-
ticipated that there will be further increases in future annuity
purchase rates. The insurance company issuing insurance under
the retirement plan guarantees that it will, eleven years hence,
make the conversion of the $60,000 of insurance to a $600.00 per
month annuity at today's annuity purchase rates.
As an alternative to the foregoing program, to guarantee the
cost of the annuity and obtain the insurance, Mr. Executive
could personally purchase from an insurance company a com-
bination insurance and annuity contract. Such a contract is com-
10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol7/iss3/18
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monly known as a "Retirement Income Contract." If such a con-
tract were bought by him from a leading first-line insurance com-
pany at his present age, the annual gross cost to him for the
next eleven years would be $9,154 per year. His salary would
have to be increased by $15,170 in order to obtain an increase in
net income after taxes of $9,154. (See Table 4 following.)
TABLE 2
Mr. Executive's Present Net Income After Taxes 15
Present Gross Income $45,000
Tax on Gross Income 1.0,152
Net Income After Taxes $34,848
TABLE 3
Mr. Executive's Net Increase in Income After
Taxes If His Salary Is Increased by $15,93515
Increased Gross Income $60,935
Tax on Increased Gross Income 16,496
Net Increased Income $44,439
Present Net Income After Taxes 34,848
Net Increase in Income $ 9,591
TABLE 4
Increase in Gross Income Necessary to Meet Premium
Payment of $9,154 on Retirement Income Contract15
Increased Gross Income $60,170
Tax on Increased Gross Income 16,168
Net Increased Income $44,002
Present Net Income After Taxes 34,848
Total Increase After Taxes $ 9,154
Increased Gross Income $60,170
Present Gross Income 45,000
Total Gross Increase in Income $15,170
15 Derivation of Taxes and Net Income as set forth in Tables 2, 3 and 4
are based on following assumptions:
(1) Total income of Mr. Executive is his salary alone;
(2) Joint return is filed by Mr. Executive;
(3) Exemptions total $1,200, composed of $600 each for Mr. Executive
and his wife;
(4) Deductions from gross income aggregate $5,000;
(5) 1957 Tax rates.
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C. Conclusions.
It is evident from the foregoing that greater retirement
benefits can be bought for Mr. Executive with money spent
before taxes than afterward. A salary increase, equivalent to
the cost of the retirement plan, would not provide him with the
extent of benefits, annuity cost and tax advantages being pro-
vided under the Plan. It should be borne in mind that the cost
to the Company for benefits under the plan is, after taxes, less
than the cost of Mr. Executive's benefits alone, so that any
"fringe benefits" going to all other employees can be said to be
paid with tax dollars.
IV. Tax Advantages to Mr. Executive and His Beneficiaries
of Benefits Provided by Plan
This section sets forth in greater detail the specific tax ad-
vantages available to Mr. Executive and his beneficiaries when
he becomes eligible for and receives the benefits of the plan
which were described in Item C of the preceding Section II.
The underlying principle to be borne in mind is that until retire-
ment age is reached, the cost of the benefits being accumulated
for Mr. Executive will not be taxable to him. The one exception
to this general principle is that the annual term cost of the
$60,000 insurance protection is considered to be income and will
constitute taxable income to him.16 Such annual term cost
amounts to approximately $650.00.
A. Tax Aspects of Normal Retirement Pension.
1. Situation-Mr. Executive elects to retire at his Normal
Retirement Age of 65 years.
2. Result-At retirement, the plan contemplates converting
Mr. Executive's insurance to an annuity. Monthly payments do
not begin until actual retirement and then will be taxed at
ordinary income tax rates.17 Mr. Executive may exclude from
gross income during the first three years annuity payments ag-
gregating the amount he has included in his income in previous
years as the term cost of insurance protection.'8  (See Item IV
preceding.) However, if a lump sum payment is made at actual
16 Treasury Decision No. 6203 (1956) on Section 402(a) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954.
17 Section 403 (a) and Section 72 of Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
18 Section 72(d) of Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
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retirement, in lieu of monthly pension payments, the lump sum
will be taxable at the capital gains rate. 19 Such rate is currently
25 per cent. It is anticipated that accumulated lump sum value
of Mr. Executive's pension at age 65 will be $97,380 (See
Column 6 of Table 1). If this sum were paid to Mr. Executive
upon his retirement at age 65, his maximum net after taxes
would be $73,035.
B. Tax Aspects of Late Retirement Pension.
1. Situation-Mr. Executive elects not to retire at his Nor-
mal Retirement Age of 65 years, but rather to continue in the
employ of the Company.
2. Result-At age 65 the insurance of $60,000 is converted
to the lump sum required to provide the pension. Such amount
of $97,380 is held by the insurance company at interest. When
Mr. Executive does finally retire, the tax results will be the
same as outlined in Item A preceding. However, should Mr.
Executive die after age 65 but before he has actually retired,
the lump sum value of $97,380 being held for him will be payable
to his beneficiary as a death benefit. Such amount will be tax-
able to the beneficiary at capital gains income tax rates, 20 and
will not be included in the estate for determination of the federal
estate tax.
21
C. Tax Aspects of Early Retirement Pension.
1. Situation-Upon attaining age 60, Mr. Executive decides
to sell a controlling interest in the Company and to retire from
active service with the Company, at a reduced monthly pension
of $315.00,22 the lump sum value of which is $57,488.
2. Result-Monthly payments will be taxed at ordinary in-
come tax rates.23 If a lump sum payment is made, capital gain
rates apply.2 4 Based on the current rate of 25 per cent, the net
after taxes to Mr. Executive would be $43,116.
19 Section 403(a)(2) of Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
20 Section 402(a) of Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
21 Section 2039(c) of Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
22 Reduced actuarial equivalent of normal monthly benefit based on years
of service to date of Early Retirement and 1937 Standard Annuity Mortality
Table-3% Interest.
23 Section 403(a) and Section 72 of Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
24 Section 403 (a) (2) of Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
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D. Tax Aspects of Disability Retirement Pension.
1. Situation-Mr. Executive becomes physically disabled at
age 57 so that he is forced to retire from active service with the
Company, at a reduced monthly pension of $325.00.25
2. Result-While monthly payments would be taxed at or-
dinary income tax rates,20 Mr. Executive can exclude from his
income up to $100.00 per week of disability payments he receives
from the plan because of personal injuries or sickness.27 Such
exclusion applies from the date disability payments begin until
Mr. Executive reaches age 65, his normal retirement age. Since
the disability pension of Mr. Executive on a weekly basis is
$75.00 ($325.00 times 12 divided by 52), being less than $100.00
per week, all of the payments are excludable from income for
the eight year period from age 57 to age 65.
E. Tax Aspects of Termination of Service Benefit.
1. Situation-Five years after the establishment of the re-
tirement plan, The X Corporation is bought out by one of the
"giants" in the field at a price too good for Mr. Executive to
pass up. He decides to take his profit from the sale and ter-
minates his services with the successor company. The successor
company, as part of the purchase agreement, assumes the obliga-
tions of, and agrees to, continue the retirement plan.
2. Result-One of the principal purposes of any employee
retirement plan is to encourage employees to remain with the
Company. Consequently, termination of service benefits are
usually the least liberal of all benefits in a retirement plan, and
in many instances, can almost be considered a penalty imposed
on the employee for leaving the Company. At the time he leaves
the Company, Mr. Executive will have had fifteen years of
service, which entitles him to 75 per cent of the then cash value
of the insurance coverage held for his benefit,28 or approximately
25 Reduced actuarial equivalent of normal monthly benefit based on 1937
Standard Annuity Mortality Table-3% Interest. No service reduction is
made in view of shorter life expectancy of disabled persons.
26 Section 403(a) and Section 72 of Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
27 Section 105(d) of Internal Revenue Code of 1954; Reg. Secs. 1.105-4(a)
(2) and 1.105-5. It is possible that semantics may result in determining
whether Mr. Executive is or is not entitled to exclude the first $100 of his
pension from income. The benefit must qualify as a disability benefit under
the statute.
28 Vesting on termination of service is at the rate of 5% of the cash value
of the insurance coverage for each year of employment. No termination
(Continued on next page)
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$6,000. Such amount is taxable to Mr. Executive at capital gains
rates.29 Mr. Executive also has the option of either converting'
the insurance to a paid-up policy of approximately $7,000, or if
he buys his non-vested portion of the cash value from the trust,
continuing the entire $60,000 on a personal basis at a premium
based on his original age at issue, which would cost Mr. Execu-
tive approximately $3,200 per year, less any dividends declared
by the insurance company.
F. Tax Aspects of Death Benefit Before Retirement.
1. Situation-Mr. Executive dies while he is in active em-
ployment and before he has reached age 65. His designated
beneficiary is his wife.
2. Result-The entire $60,000 of insurance, less the cash
value of such insurance at the time of death, is payable to the
beneficiary exempt from any income tax.30 If the cash value at
the time of death exceeds $5,000, only the excess cash value is
taxable to the beneficiary, and at capital gains rates; if the cash
value is less than $5,000, such cash value is excluded entirely
from the income of the beneficiary. 31 The entire proceeds of
$60,000 are excluded from Mr. Executive's estate for determina-
tion of the federal estate tax.3 2
G. Tax Aspect of Death Benefit After Retirement.
1. Situation-Mr. Executive has retired at age 65 and is re-
ceiving a monthly pension of $600.00. After receiving 48 monthly
payments (four years), Mr. Executive dies. His named benefi-
ciary is entitled to receive the balance of 72 monthly payments
(6 years), so that an aggregate of 120 monthly payments will
have been made to Mr. Executive and his wife.
2. Result-If the beneficiary of Mr. Executive elects to re-
ceive payment in the form of a monthly annuity, such annuity
(Continued from preceding page)
benefit is payable from the Auxiliary Conversion Fund since costs for such
fund have been discounted on a conservative basis for anticipated labor
turnover.
29 Section 403(a) (2) of Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
30 Section 101(a) and (b) of Internal Revenue Code of 1954; Reg. Sec.
1.402(a) -1 (a) (4) (iii).
31 Section 402 (a) of Internal Revenue Code; Reg. Sec. 1.402 (a) -1(a) (4').
32 Section 2039(c) of Internal Revenue Code; Regulations published in
Treasury Decision 6296 (1958).
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payments are taxable at ordinary income tax rates.3 3 If the
beneficiary should elect to take the commuted lump sum value
of the unpaid installments, such value is taxable at capital gains
rates. 34 In either event, the entire amount received is excluded
from Mr. Executive's estate for federal estate tax purposes.35
V. Summary
Senate Resolution 215 of the 75th Congress, proposed by
Senator Vandenberg of Michigan, authorized a study of the then
(1938) pension and profit-sharing plans in the country. The
study attempted to determine the propriety of what encourage-
ment the Federal Government could give to the adoption of pen-
sion and profit-sharing plans, including "the grant of compensa-
tory tax exemptions and tax awards when profit-sharing is
voluntarily established.''36 The Committee concluded that it
was not practical to apply incentive taxation to the profit-
sharing motive.37 Yet it cannot be denied that the tax rates of
today and the temporary exemption from taxation of benefits
accrued provide Mr. Executive with strong incentives to adopt
his program and cover his employees so that he may minimize
his taxes while increasing his wealth through deferment of in-
come. The foregoing example shows concretely, we think, that
in terms of measuring a salary increase sufficient to buy benefits
outside the program equivalent to the benefits obtainable under
the program, the adoption of the program presents Mr. Execu-
tive with the better alternative.
Multiply Mr. Executive by the many Messrs. Executive
there are in this country and we begin to see why there has
been such a great increase in the number of programs adopted
in the last fifteen years. Multiply the number of Mr. Executive's
employees by the number of employees of the many Messrs.
Executive in the country and we begin to visualize how broad
has become the coverage of pension plans in the country today.
To determine whether the programs are carrying out a
legitimate social purpose recognized as such by Congress, we
33 Reg. Sec. 1.402 (a) -1 (a) (5).
34 Section 402(a) of Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
35 Section 2039(c) of Internal Revenue Code of 1954; Regulations published
in Treasury Decision 6296 (1958).
36 "Study of Experiences in Profit Sharing and Possibilities of Inactive
Taxation," Senate, 76th Congress, 1st Session, Report No. 610. June 19, 1939-
Ordered to be printed. P. 1.
37 Ibid., p. 6.
16https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol7/iss3/18
TAX OF RETIREMENT PLANS
must distinguish between Mr. Executive's motives for adoption
of the program and the results to Mr. Executive, on the one
hand, and the results to the other employees. Referring back
to Table 1, we note that the bulk of the employees of Mr. Execu-
tive fall below the concept of being highly compensated as we
understand that term today. Inflation and taxes make it difficult
for these people to save for old age, and yet we must face the
fact that we are dealing with a work force which is about to
swell in the near future as the children of our baby boom of the
1940's and 1950's become working men and women of the 1960's
and 1970's. Increased pressures will be brought to bear to cause
the aged to absent themselves from the labor force. From what
resources are they to draw on, to live in a non-working period
of life, other than public and private pensions, asset income and
dissaving? We do not suggest that a pension plan will solve all
the problems for these people or that it should lull them into a
false sense of old-age security, but we do suggest that the tax
reasons for the adoption of the program will result in income
being paid to them at a time when they may not be able to earn
income. Whether or not as many programs would have been
installed without the tax reasons is answered by comparing the
number of programs in effect in 1930-110-with the number in
effect in 1958--43,000.
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